An incentive compatible approach to the transfer pricing problem
An incentive compatible approach to the transfer pricing problem
复制标题
转让定价问题的激励兼容方法
DOI：
10.1016/0022-1996(90)90054-p
复制
发表时间：
1990
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
Thomas J. Prusa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Thomas J. Prusa
本文提供了一种调节某些类型转移定价的替代方法。如果跨国企业的转让价格决策不受监管，它就会操纵转让价格以实现全球净利润的最大化。传统的方法主张采用特别的惩罚计划来减轻转移定价的操纵；相比之下，本文提供了一种激励相容的方法，明确地结合了鼓励误报的信息不对称。该模型具有理想的特征，即最优监管政策具有“自我执行”属性。也就是说，公司会发现报告真实成本会使利润最大化。
This paper offers an alternative approach to regulating certain types of transfer pricing. If the multinational enterprise's transfer price decision is not regulated, it will manipulate the transfer price in order to maximize net global profit. Traditional approaches argue for ad hoc penalty schedules to mitigate manipulative transfer pricing; in contrast, this paper offers an incentive compatible approach which explicitly incorporates the informational asymmetries that encourage misreports. The model has the desirous feature that the optimal regulatory policy has ‘self-enforcing’ properties. That is, the firm will find it profit maximizing to report true costs.