Multiple demonstrations of metacognition in nonhumans: Converging evidence or multiple mechanisms?
Multiple demonstrations of metacognition in nonhumans: Converging evidence or multiple mechanisms?
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DOI：
10.3819/ccbr.2009.40002
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发表时间：
2009-01-01
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Hampton, Robert R.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hampton, Robert R.
元认知允许一个人监控和自适应地控制认知过程。过去15年的报告显示，当有机会时，非人类动物选择性地避免接受记忆或感知的困难测试，在测试前收集更多的信息，或者在记忆和感知测试中“赌博”更多的食物奖励。我回顾代表性的例子，从这方面的文献，考虑到四类机制的充分性，以说明观察到的metacogastric性能。这项分析表明，许多非人类的元认知可以用联想学习或其他不需要调用内省或进入私人心理状态的机制来解释。考虑这些帐户可能会促使更多的赞赏元认知现象的多样性，并可能告知理论立场的性质，心理表征的基础元认知
Metacognition allows one to monitor and adaptively control cognitive processes. Reports from the last 15 years show that when given the opportunity, nonhuman animals selectively avoid taking difficult tests of memory or perception, collect more information if needed before taking tests, or "gamble" more food reward on correct than on incorrect responses in tests of memory and perception. I review representative examples from this literature, considering the sufficiency of four classes of mechanism to account for the metacognitive performance observed. This analysis suggests that many of the demonstrations of metacognition in nonhumans can be explained in terms of associative learning or other mechanisms that do not require invoking introspection or access to private mental states. Consideration of these accounts may prompt greater appreciation of the diversity of metacognitive phenomena and may inform theoretical positions about the nature of the mental representations underlying metacognition