Selling Information
Selling Information
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销售信息
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3025136
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Weijie Zhong
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Weijie Zhong
我考虑的是信息商品的垄断定价。购买者为信息付费的意愿来自于对决策行为的未知回报的推断。垄断性的卖者和买者各自观察到一个关于收益的私人信号。卖方的信号是二元的，她可以承诺将她的信号的任何统计实验卖给买方。假设买方决策问题涉及丰富的行为，我描述了利润最大化菜单。它包含连续的实验，每个实验包含不同数量的信息。我还发现了买方私人信息与信息提供之间的互补性：当买方私人信号信息量越大时，最优菜单中包含的信息量越大。
I consider the monopolistic pricing of informational good. A buyer's willingness to pay for information is from inferring the unknown payoffs of actions in decision making. A monopolistic seller and the buyer each observes a private signal about the payoffs. The seller's signal is binary and she can commit to sell any statistical experiment of her signal to the buyer. Assuming that buyer's decision problem involves rich actions, I characterize the profit maximizing menu. It contains a continuum of experiments, each containing different amount of information. I also find a complementarity between buyer's private information and information provision: when buyer's private signal is more informative, the optimal menu contains more informative experiments.