Ride the Lightning: The Game Theory of Payment Channels
Ride the Lightning: The Game Theory of Payment Channels
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乘风破浪：支付渠道的博弈论
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-030-51280-4_15
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
3.7
通讯作者：
Roger Wattenhofer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Zeta Avarikioti;Lioba Heimbach;Yuyi Wang;Roger Wattenhofer
引入支付渠道是为了解决各种突出的加密货币可扩展性问题。多个支付渠道在区块链之上构建一个网络，即所谓的第二层。在这项工作中，我们通过网络创建游戏的角度来分析支付网络。我们将介数和紧密中心性视为支付网络的核心概念。我们研究参与者自私行为时出现的拓扑，并确定他们构成纳什均衡的参数空间。此外，我们根据介数和亲密中心性的相关性来确定社会最优值。如果可能的话，我们限制无政府状态的代价。我们还简要讨论了稳定的代价。
Payment channels were introduced to solve various eminent cryptocurrency scalability issues. Multiple payment channels build a network on top of a blockchain, the so-called layer 2. In this work, we analyze payment networks through the lens of network creation games. We identify betweenness and closeness centrality as central concepts regarding payment networks. We study the topologies that emerge when players act selfishly and determine the parameter space in which they constitute a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we determine the social optima depending on the correlation of betweenness and closeness centrality. When possible, we bound the price of anarchy. We also briefly discuss the price of stability.