On implementation via demand commitment games
On implementation via demand commitment games
复制标题
论通过需求承诺游戏来实施
DOI：
10.1007/s001820050064
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发表时间：
1998
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
Y. Stephen Chiu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Dasgupta;Y. Stephen Chiu
给出了需求承诺博弈的一个简单形式，实现了Shapley值作为任意人特征函数博弈的唯一子博弈完美均衡结果。这在以前致力于这一实现问题的模型的基础上，在以下一个或多个方面进行了改进：a)所述特征函数博弈的范围，b)潜在的非合作博弈的简单性(它是一个有限的水平博弈，其中个人提出需求并形成联盟，而不是提出综合的分配建议)，以及c)非合作均衡概念的普遍可接受性。给出了产生Shapley值结果的均衡策略的完整描述。此外，对于三人博弈，证明了需求承诺博弈可以实现不需要是凸的，但具有非空内部的核心的博弈的核心。
A simple version of the Demand Commitment Game is shown to implement the Shapley value as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome for anyn-person characteristic function game. This improves upon previous models devoted to this implementation problem in terms of one or more of the following: a) the range of characteristic function games addressed, b) the simplicity of the underlying noncooperative game (it is a finite horizon game where individuals make demands and form coalitions rather than make comprehensive allocation proposals and c) the general acceptability of the noncooperative equilibrium concept. A complete characterization of an equilibrium strategy generating the Shapley value outcomes is provided. Furthermore, for 3 player games, it is shown that the Demand Commitment Game can implement the core for games which need not be convex but have cores with nonempty interiors.