The Fed-induced political business cycle: Empirical evidence from a time－frequency view
The Fed-induced political business cycle: Empirical evidence from a time－frequency view
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美联储引发的政治商业周期：时频视角的经验证据
DOI：
10.1016/j.econmod.2016.01.011
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
4.7
通讯作者：
Yoshito Funashima
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
東田晋三;湯口恭子;青木 研;Yoshito Funashima;舟島義人・堀場勇夫・宮原勝一;Yoshito Funashima
鉴于诺德豪斯的政治经济周期理论与选举周期频率相关，而且其有效性可能会随着时间的推移而变化，我们进行了特别适合于测试该理论的小波分析。对于战后的美国经济，我们利用小波方法来检验货币政策中是否确实存在机会主义的政治经济周期。我们的结果表明，除20世纪90年代外，美联储有在总统选举前下调基金利率的倾向。事实证明，这种政治操纵不仅严重影响了著名的伯恩斯-尼克松时代的产出，也影响了沃尔克-里根时代的产出。此外，央行的独立性被证明在过去30年里得到了相对加强。即使在控制政府支出影响的情况下，结果也是强劲的。此外，我们认为，这些证据很可能可以通过选民偏好的变化来解释。
Given that Nordhaus' political business cycle theory is relevant at election cycle frequency and that its validity can change over time, we conduct a wavelet analysis that is especially suited to test the theory. For the postwar U.S. economy, we harness wavelet methods to examine whether there actually exists an opportunistic political business cycle in monetary policy. Our results indicate an inclination of the Federal Reserve to cut the funds rate prior to presidential elections except for the 1990s. Such political manipulation is shown to significantly affect output in not only the famous Burns–Nixon era but also the Volcker–Reagan era. Moreover, central bank independence is shown to have relatively strengthened in the last three decades. The outcomes are robust even when the effects of government spending are controlled for. Further, we argue that it is likely that such evidence can be explained by changes in preferences of voters.