Asymmetric risk and fuel neutrality in electricity capacity markets
Asymmetric risk and fuel neutrality in electricity capacity markets
复制标题
电力容量市场的不对称风险和燃料中性
DOI：
10.1038/s41560-019-0476-1
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
56.7
通讯作者：
R. O'Neill
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Mays;D. Morton;R. O'Neill
在许多自由化的电力市场中，发电商可以通过容量市场获得维持容量的费用。这些付款有助于稳定发电商的收入，在其他风险交易渠道有限的情况下，使对发电能力的投资对规避风险的投资者更具吸引力。在这里，我们开发了一个启发式算法来解决大规模的随机均衡模型描述了一个竞争的市场与不完全风险交易。引入容量机制对不同发电技术的风险状况产生不对称影响，使资源组合向固定成本较低和运营成本较高的技术倾斜。这一结果的一个含义是，目前的市场结构可能不适合为低碳资源融资，其中最具规模的资源固定成本很高，运营成本接近于零。发展新的风险交易机制以取代或补充目前的能力义务，可产生更有效的结果。产能市场旨在确保有足够的生产能力来满足高峰需求。Mays等人的研究表明，这些市场青睐煤炭和天然气等技术，因为它们可以降低资本投资风险，而不会补偿与太阳能和风能相关的运营风险。
In many liberalized electricity markets, power generators can receive payments for maintaining capacity through capacity markets. These payments help stabilize generator revenues, making investment in capacity more attractive for risk-averse investors when other outlets for risk trading are limited. Here we develop a heuristic algorithm to solve large-scale stochastic equilibrium models describing a competitive market with incomplete risk trading. Introduction of a capacity mechanism has an asymmetric effect on the risk profile of different generation technologies, tilting the resource mix towards those with lower fixed costs and higher operating costs. One implication of this result is that current market structures may be ill-suited to financing low-carbon resources, the most scalable of which have high fixed costs and near-zero operating costs. Development of new risk trading mechanisms to replace or complement current capacity obligations could lead to more efficient outcomes. Capacity markets are designed to ensure availability of sufficient production capacity to meet peak demand. Mays et al. show that these markets favour technologies such as coal and gas by mitigating their capital investment risks while not compensating for operational risks associated with solar and wind energy.
影响因子：
4.9
作者：
Britz, Wolfgang;Ferris, Michael;Kuhn, Arnim
通讯作者：
Kuhn, Arnim