Share Repurchases as a Potential Tool to Mislead Investors
Share Repurchases as a Potential Tool to Mislead Investors
复制标题
股票回购是误导投资者的潜在工具
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1485583
复制
发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Yanzhi Wang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
K. Chan;D. Ikenberry;I. Lee;Yanzhi Wang
大量文献认为，股票回购通常是对投资者有利的积极经济信号。然而，由于其固有的灵活性，公开市场回购计划长期以来一直被批评为缺乏承诺的弱信号。我们评估一些管理人是否可能利用回购公告来误导投资者。我们关注的是管理者似乎面临提振股价的巨大压力的案例，他们可能宣布回购只是为了传达错误信号。对于可疑案例，市场对回购公告的立即反应与通常观察到的没有什么不同。然而，从长远来看，可疑企业并没有享受到以其他方式观察到的经济绩效的改善。可疑公司回购的股票减少。此外，可疑公司的经理对股票期权的敞口相对较高，这是一个潜在的内生结果，表明对股票估值和未来股权稀释更加敏感。总体而言，结果表明，只有有限数量的管理者可能以误导性的方式将回购视为“廉价言论”。然而，正如理论所表明的那样，我们发现这种行为没有长期的经济效益。
A rich literature argues that stock repurchases often serve as positive economic signals beneficial to investors. Yet due to their inherent flexibility, open-market repurchase programs have long been criticized as weak signals lacking commitment. We evaluate whether some managers potentially use buyback announcements to mislead investors. We focus on cases where managers were seemingly under heavy pressure to boost stock prices and might have announced a repurchase only to convey a false signal. For suspect cases, the immediate market reaction to a buyback announcement does not differ from that generally observed. However over longer horizons, suspect firms do not enjoy the improvement in economic performance otherwise observed. Suspect firms repurchase less stock. Further, managers in suspect firms have comparatively higher exposure to stock options, a potentially endogenous result suggesting greater sensitivity to both stock valuation and to future equity dilution. Overall, the results suggest only a limited number of managers may have used buybacks in a misleading way as "cheap talk." Yet as theory also suggests, we find no long-run economic benefit to this behavior.