Platform Encroachment and Own‐Content Bias*

Platform Encroachment and Own‐Content Bias*
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平台入侵和自有内容偏见*

DOI:
10.1111/joie.12301
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发表时间:
2022
期刊:
The Journal of Industrial Economics
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Zennyo Yusuke
Zennyo Yusuke
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
FENG Chaoyu;TSURUMI Hiroyuki;玉井 寿樹;Takashi Oshio;Zennyo Yusuke

文献摘要

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本文提出了一种平台侵占模型,其中平台不仅充当消费者和第三方卖家之间的中介,而且还销售其第一方产品。当侵犯时,平台会在公平和有偏见的搜索引擎之间进行选择。在公平搜索下,所有产品出现在搜索结果中的可能性相同,而在偏见搜索下,第一方产品更有可能出现。有偏见的侵占使得平台向卖家收取较低的佣金,从而导致均衡价格较低,从而吸引更多的消费者。增加消费者参与可以通过间接网络外部性提高卖家参与。
This paper presents a model of platform encroachment, in which a platform not only acts as an intermediary between consumers and third‐party sellers, but also sells its first‐party products. When encroaching, the platform chooses between fair and biased search engines. Under the fair search, all products are equally likely to appear in search results, whereas the first‐party product is more likely to appear under biased search. Biased encroachment makes the platform impose a lower commission on sellers, which leads to a lower equilibrium price which consequently attracts more consumers. Increased consumer participation can raise seller participation through indirect network externalities.