Shared Knowledge from Individual Vice: the Role of Unworthy Epistemic Emotions
Shared Knowledge from Individual Vice: the Role of Unworthy Epistemic Emotions
复制标题
来自个人恶习的共享知识：无价值的认知情绪的作用
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. Morton
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Morton
这篇文章首先讨论了不那么令人钦佩的认知情绪在我们可敬的、实际上是令人钦佩的询问中的作用：好管闲事、痴迷、一厢情愿、否认、党派之争。对其理想效果的解释是曼德维利式的：由于认知性劳动的分工，个别的认知性错误可以导致共享知识。事实上，它有时是必不可少的。
This paper begins with a discussion the role of less-than-admirable epistemic emotions in our respectable, indeed admirable inquiries: nosiness, obsessiveness, wishful thinking, denial, partisanship. The explanation for their desirable effect is Mandevillian: because of the division of epistemic labour individual epistemic vices can lead to shared knowledge. In fact it is sometimes essential to it.