Okinawa henkan to nichibei anpo taisei (The Reversion of Okinawa and the Japan-US Security Alliance)
Okinawa henkan to nichibei anpo taisei (The Reversion of Okinawa and the Japan-US Security Alliance)
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Okinawa henkan to nichibei anpo taisei（冲绳的回归和日美安保同盟）
DOI：
10.1093/ssjj/jyu037
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Yasuko Kouno
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yasuko Kouno
本书探讨了两个关键问题。第一个问题是，1969年11月，日美两国就归还冲绳主权的谈判达成协议的原因和过程。另一个问题是，在美日安全同盟的更广泛历史中，这种回归的意义。本书的原创性贡献主要在于对第一个问题的回答，其中包括对秘密渠道谈判的政治过程分析，并阐明了这些渠道的性质及其在外交过程中的作用。首先，作者中岛考察了1967年日本首相佐藤和美国总统约翰逊发表的联合公报的准备情况，描述了佐藤的私人特使若泉庆是如何利用佐藤建立的秘密渠道与总统特别助理WW Rostow达成协议的，归还问题将在“几年内”确定。这一确切措辞已载入联合公报。因此，中岛对佐藤在这些讨论中的主动性的评价比以前的研究更加积极。Nakashima接着研究了关于1969年实际归还协议的几个问题。谈判中的关键争论点是如何处理1960年《安全条约》续签时引入的“事先磋商”制度。这一制度限制了美国军队在日本领土上的行动。然而，在1960年续签时，《安全保障条约》并不适用于仍在美国管辖下的冲绳，因此，美军能够使用其在冲绳的基地，而不受条约条款适用于大陆基地的限制。在1969年谈判回归时，日本政府要求在回归后的冲绳相应地适用事先协商制度，并认为冲绳岛必须“与日本大陆看齐”。然而，在冲绳基地实施事先协商制度存在两个问题。第一个是这样的应用程序将限制基地的自由使用;换句话说，它©作者2014。由牛津大学出版社与东京大学联合出版。
This book addresses two key questions. The first of these is why and how Japan and the US reached agreement in November 1969 in negotiations over the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty. The other question concerns the meaning of the reversion in the broader history of the US–Japan security alliance. The book’s original contribution lies primarily in its response to the first question, a response which comprises political process analysis of back-channel negotiations and sheds light on the nature of these channels and their role in the diplomatic process. Firstly, the author Nakashima examines the lead-up to the Joint Communiqué issued by Japanese Prime Minister Satō and American President Johnson in 1967, describing how a back channel established by Satō was used by Wakaizumi Kei (Satō’s personal emissary) to reach an agreement with Special Assistant to the President WW Rostow that the reversion issue was to be determined ‘within a few years’. This exact wording was included in the Joint Communiqué. Nakashima’s assessment of Satō’s initiative in these discussions is thus more positive than previous studies. Nakashima goes on to examine several issues in regard to the actual reversion agreement of 1969. The key point of contention in the negotiations was the handling of the ‘prior consultation’system introduced at the time of the renewal of the Security Treaty in 1960. This system placed restrictions on US military forces operating on Japanese territory. At the time of the 1960 renewal, however, the Security Treaty did not apply to Okinawa, which was still under US administration, and the US military was thus able to use its bases on Okinawa free from the restrictions that applied to mainland bases under the terms of the treaty. When it came to negotiating the reversion in 1969, the Japanese government sought to have the prior consultation system apply correspondingly to post-reversion Okinawa, which, it argued, must be ‘on par with mainland Japan’. There were, however, two problems in applying the prior consultation system to the Okinawan bases. The first was that such an application would restrict free use of the bases; in other words, it© The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press in conjunction with the University of Tokyo.