Enterprise reform in China: agency problems and political control
Enterprise reform in China: agency problems and political control
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0351.1996.tb00181.x
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发表时间：
1996-10
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Y. Qian
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Y. Qian
中国过去的国有企业改革将许多有效控制权下放给了管理者，同时保留了党和政府的最终控制权。其结果是要么因为管理者缺乏责任而导致代理成本高，要么因为政府进行政治干预而导致政治成本高。中国国有企业的改革应以降低政治成本和代理成本为目标，这可以通过去政治化、有效的公司治理和去序列化来实现。特别是，中国需要进行私有化、非国有化和多元化相结合的所有制转型；限制政府政治影响的国有资产管理体系；公司化以建立有效的公司治理，可以采取多种形式。
The past reforms of state‐owned enterprises in China delegated many effective control rights to managers while maintaining ultimate control rights for the Party and government. The result is that either the agency costs are high because managers lack accountability or the political costs are high because the government causes political interference. Reform of state‐owned enterprises in China should aim at reducing both political and agency costs, which can be done through depoliticization, effective corporate governance, and deserialization. In particular, China needs an ownership transformation with a combination of privatization, denationalization, and pluralization; a state assets management system to limit political influence from the government; and corporatization to establish effective corporate governance which may take a variety of forms.