The Welfare State or the Economy? Preferences, Constituencies, and Strategies for Retrenchment
The Welfare State or the Economy? Preferences, Constituencies, and Strategies for Retrenchment
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福利国家还是经济？
DOI：
10.1093/esr/jcs082
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发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
3.2
通讯作者：
Moira Nelson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
N. Giger;Moira Nelson
选民系统地捍卫福利国家的假设受到了最近的研究的挑战，研究表明，政党平均而言不会因为福利国家的紧缩而受到惩罚，有时甚至会得到奖励。我们致力于通过探索个人对社会政策的偏好来更好地理解这一非惩罚结论的微观基础。特别是，我们将普遍支持再分配的观点与认为现有政府支出水平给经济带来压力的观点区分开来。除了平等之外，选民还看重经济稳定，因此当他们觉得有经济代价时，他们就会容忍或支持削减开支。使用第四轮欧洲社会调查的数据分析了13个欧洲社会的样本，我们的结果显示，只有不认为福利国家阻碍经济的福利国家支持者才会惩罚紧缩的政府。这一发现有助于解释为什么削减开支后没有更广泛的选举惩罚，尽管其他结果也表明，削减开支涉及一个相当微妙的过程，需要平衡不同选民的偏好。
The assumption that voters systematically defend the welfare state is challenged by recent research showing that parties are on average not punished and sometimes even rewarded for welfare state retrenchment. We work to understand better the micro-foundations for this finding of non-punishment by exploring individuals’ preferences over social policy. In particular, we distinguish general support for redistribution from views that existing levels of government spending strain the economy. As voters value economic stability in addition to equality, they are hypothesized to tolerate or support retrenchment when they feel that there are economic costs at stake. Analyzing a sample of 13 European societies with data from the European Social Survey Round 4, our results show that only welfare state supporters who do not believe that the welfare state hampers the economy punish retrenching governments. This finding helps explain the lack of more widespread electoral punishment following retrenchment, though other results also suggest that retrenchment involves a rather delicate process of juggling the preferences of diverse constituencies.
神经病学年度回顾 2003
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
--
作者：
Murayama;A.;Matsuzaki;Y.;Kawaguchi;A;Shimazaki.T.;Okano;H.;仲嶋一範
通讯作者：
仲嶋一範