Standard Setting Organisations and Standard Essential Patents: Voting and Markets
Standard Setting Organisations and Standard Essential Patents: Voting and Markets
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标准制定组织和标准必要专利：投票和市场
DOI：
10.1111/ecoj.12606
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Daniel F. Spulber
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Daniel F. Spulber
关键的发现是，标准制定组织（SSO）选择有效的技术标准，因为投票权和市场力量具有制衡作用。市场多头的代理人在市场上的附加值较少，但在合作组织中有更多的投票权，而市场空头的代理人则相反。在两阶段模型中，行业成员通过投票选择技术标准，然后在市场上竞争。即使在垂直行业团体之间存在分歧时，SSO成员也会一致投票支持高效标准。当有标准必要专利（SEP）时，技术采用者也会一致投票支持高效标准。拥有SEP的发明人将在某些投票规则下支持有效标准。当行业团体内部存在分歧时，SSO成员通过多数原则选择有效的标准，无论是否有SEP。当有效标准有SEP而无效标准没有SEP时，SSO成员选择具有剧烈创新的有效标准，或者当创新不剧烈时，选择具有特定投票规则的有效标准。这些结果有助于解释SSO对技术标准的选择、SSO投票规则的设计以及SSO管理知识产权（IP）规则的选择。
The key finding is that Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs) choose efficient technology standards because voting power and market power have counterbalancing effects. Agents on the long side of the market have less added value in the marketplace but more voting power in cooperative organizations and conversely for the short side of the market. In a two-stage model, industry members choose technology standards by voting and then compete in the marketplace. Even when there are disagreements among vertical industry groups, SSO members vote for the efficient standard unanimously. When there are Standard Essential Patents (SEPs), technology adopters also vote for the efficient standard unanimously. Inventors that own SEPs will support the efficient standard under some voting rules. When there are disagreements within industry groups, SSO members choose efficient standards by majority rule, with or without SEPs. When the efficient standard has SEPs and the inefficient standard does not, SSO members choose the efficient standard with a drastic innovation or, when the innovation is non-drastic, with particular voting rules. The results help explain the choice of technology standards by SSOs, the design of SSO voting rules, and the selection of SSO rules governing intellectual property (IP).
专利池的形成：时机很重要
影响因子：
2.8
作者：
Leveque;F.;Meniere;Y.
通讯作者：
Y.