Internal Promotion and External Recruitment: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis
Internal Promotion and External Recruitment: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis
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内部晋升与外部招聘：理论与实证分析
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
H. Morita
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jed DeVaro;H. Morita
本文采用一种工作分配模型，对内部晋升与外部招聘进行了理论和实证分析，该模型涉及具有异质生产率和一个管理职位的两级工作等级的竞争公司。该模型预测，在控制管理人员数量的情况下，增加低层员工的数量与以下因素相关：(1)更大的内部晋升（而不是外部招聘），(2)更高的利润，(3)更多的一般培训。对大量英国雇主的实证分析与这些预测一致。
We present a theoretical and empirical analysis of internal promotion versus external recruitment, using a job-assignment model involving competing firms with heterogeneous productivities and two-level job hierarchies with one managerial position. The model predicts that, controlling for the number of managers, increasing the number of lower-level workers is associated with (1) greater internal promotion as opposed to external recruitment, (2) higher profit, and (3) more general training. Empirical analysis of a large cross section of British employers is consistent with these predictions.