Tradeable carbon permit auctions - How and why to auction not grandfather
Tradeable carbon permit auctions - How and why to auction not grandfather
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/s0301-4215(01)00100-8
复制
发表时间：
2002-03-01
期刊：
影响因子：
9
通讯作者：
Kerr, S
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cramton, P;Kerr, S
拍卖碳排放许可证是实现旨在限制全球气候变化的国内碳排放上限的最佳途径。为了尽量减少行政费用，炼油厂、天然气管道、天然气液体销售商都需要许可证。煤炭加工厂。使二级市场的流动性最大化。许可证将是完全可交易和银行可接受的。政府将进行季度拍卖。一个标准的上升时钟拍卖，价格逐渐提高，直到没有多余的需求将提供可靠的价格发现。拍卖比祖父（根据历史产量或排放量向公司发放许可证）更受欢迎，因为它可以减少税收扭曲，在成本分配方面提供更大的灵活性，为创新提供更大的激励。并减少了在租金分配问题上引发政治争议的必要性。(C)2002爱思唯尔科技有限公司版权所有。
An auction of carbon permits is the best way to achieve domestic carbon caps designed to limit global climate change. To minimize administrative costs, permits would be required at the level of oil refineries, natural gas pipe lines, natural gas liquid sellers. and coal processing plants. To maximize liquidity in secondary markets. permits would be fully tradable and bank-able. The government would conduct quarterly auctions. A standard ascending-clock auction in which price is gradually raised until there is no excess demand would provide reliable price discovery. An auction is preferred to grandfathering (giving companies permits based on historical output or emissions), because it allows reduced tax distortions, provides more flexibility in distribution of costs, provides greater incentives for innovation. and reduces the need for politically contentious arguments over the allocation of rents. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.