Supplier-Manufacturer Relationships Under Forced Compliance Contracts
Supplier-Manufacturer Relationships Under Forced Compliance Contracts
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DOI：
10.1287/msom.5.1.67.12760
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发表时间：
2003-01
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
N. Golovachkina
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
N. Golovachkina
今天，许多零售商都采用精益战略来提高效率（见阿伯纳西等人，1999）。为精益零售商供货的制造商必须准确、快速、高效地完成订单，尽管需求波动，但要适当地构建生产和运输流程。运输外包已变得普遍;在这种情况下，可能会签订合同，具体规定物流供应商向制造商保证多少能力。鉴于在“精益零售商”的背景下，对运输服务的需求每天都在变化，合同必须考虑到如果运输要求超过商定的能力，制造商无法满足零售商需求的风险，以及物流供应商无法使用所有承诺能力的风险。使用电子现货市场运输已变得普遍，并提供了一种手段，以减轻这些风险的运输供应商可以出售未使用的能力，而制造商可以确保额外的运输服务时，物流供应商的承诺能力不足。在本文中，我们分析了在这种情况下，它的能力，以减轻需求和现货价格的不确定性的影响，以及如何每一方，供应链的整体，从合同中受益。我们分析了一个合同的选项nonstorable产品或服务，如运输，在一个单一的供应商和一个单一的制造商之间的现货市场的存在，供应商的能力有限，制造商必须满足周期性的随机需求从下游supplychain链接，如精益零售商，在充分。我们假设制造商所需的商品数量总是可以在现货市场上以某种价格获得，现货市场价格是外生的，供应商和买方都没有足够的规模对它产生可感知的影响，我们将我们的问题建模为两阶段的Stackelberg博弈，其中供应商是领导者。在第一阶段，供应商向制造商提供一份带有保留价格和执行价格的期权合同。作为响应，制造商从供应商购买一定数量的选项，之后供应商确定向制造商或现货市场提供的商品或服务的总量。第二阶段初期，实现需求和现货价格。在观察这些信息后，制造商决定与供应商进行多少选择，以及在现货市场购买多少。制造商可以将现货市场视为产品的替代来源：如果现货市场价格低于供应商的执行价格，那么制造商只从现货市场购买;否则，只有当储备能力不足以完全满足需求时，制造商才从现货市场购买。在制造商的订单完成后，我们假设供应商可以以一定的价格将其所有多余的库存出售给现货市场，这可能是有利可图的，也可能不是。我们评估这样的合同在协调渠道的有效性，如何设置最优的政策，以及如何在双方之间共享合同的价值。几篇论文分析了远期期权是否可以协调渠道，确保双方的激励相容性，或者是否额外的
Today, many retailers are adopting lean strategies to improve efficiency (see Abernathy et al. 1999). Manufacturers that supply lean retailers must fulfill orders accurately, rapidly, and efficiently, despite demand volatility, by appropriately structuring their production and transportation processes. The outsourcing of transportation has become common; in this case a contract might be struck that specifies how much capacity a logistics provider guarantees to the manufacturer. Given that the demand for transportation services varies day by day in the “lean-retailer” context, the contract must take into account the manufacturer’s risk of not fulfilling the retailer’s demand if the transportation requirements exceed the agreed upon capacity and the logistics provider’s risk of not using all of the committed capacity. The use of electronic spot markets for transportation has become prevalent and offers one means to mitigate these risks—the transportation provider can sell unused capacity while the manufacturer can secure additional transportation services when the logistics provider’s promised capacity is insufficient. In this paper we analyze a contract in this context and its capability to mitigate the effects of demand and spot-price uncertainties, as well as how each party, and the supply chain in total, benefits from the contract. We analyze a contract for options for nonstorable products or services, such as transportation, between a single supplier and a single manufacturer in the presence of a spot market, where the supplier has limited capacity and the manufacturer must fulfill periodic stochastic demand from a downstream supplychain link, such as a lean retailer, in full. We assume that the quantity of goods desired by the manufacturer is always available on the spot market at some price, that the spot-market price is exogenous, and that neither the supplier nor buyer is of sufficient size to have a perceptible effect on it. We model our problem as a two-stage Stackelberg game in which the supplier is the leader. At stage one, the supplier offers the manufacturer a contract for options with a reservation price and an exercise price. In response, the manufacturer purchases a certain number of options from the supplier, after which the supplier determines the total quantity of goods or services to make available to the manufacturer or the spot market. At the beginning of the second stage, demand and spot price are realized. After observing this information, the manufacturer decides how many options to exercise with the supplier and how much to purchase on the spot market. The manufacturer can view the spot market as an alternative source of the product: If the spot market price is below the supplier’s exercise price, then the manufacturer buys only from the spot market; otherwise, she buys from the spot market only if the reserved capacity is insufficient to satisfy the demand in full. After the manufacturer’s order is filled, we assume that the supplier can sell all his excess inventory to the spot market at some price, which may or may not be profitable. We assess the effectiveness of such a contract in coordinating the channel, how the optimal policies are set, and how the value of the contract is shared between the parties. Several papers analyze whether forward options can coordinate the channel and ensure incentive compatibility for both players, or whether additional