Efficient Allocations with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending
Efficient Allocations with Moral Hazard and Hidden Borrowing and Lending
复制标题
存在道德风险和隐性借贷的高效配置
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
N. Pavoni
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
�?rpád J. �?brahám;N. Pavoni
我们分析了一个动态的道德风险设置，代理人可以借和贷，他们的努力，消费和储蓄的决定是私人信息。与以往的研究结果相比，我们表明，只要代理人没有完美的控制公开可观察的结果，有效的分配福利改善的情况下，代理人可以自我保险，只有通过借贷。我们确定了福利改善的主要来源，并计算了显着的效率收益。我们提供了一个易于处理的递归框架来研究在这种情况下的最优分配。动态规划制定是基于广义一阶的方法，其有效性事后验证，使用一个简约的数值程序的基础上的递归制定本身。
We analyze a dynamic moral hazard setting, in which agents can borrow and lend and their decisions about effort, consumption and savings are private information. In contrast with previous findings, we show that as long as agents do not have perfect control over publicly observable outcomes, the efficient allocation is welfare improving with respect to the case where the agents can self insure only through borrowing and lending. We identify the main sources of welfare improvement, and we compute substantial efficiency gains. We provide a tractable recursive framework to study the optimal allocation in this setting. The dynamic programming formulation is based on a generalized first order approach, whose validity is verified ex post, using a parsimonious numerical procedure based on the recursive formulation itself.