Market Experimentation and Pricing
Market Experimentation and Pricing
复制标题
市场实验和定价
DOI：
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发表时间：
1996
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Juuso Välimäki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Bergemann;Juuso Välimäki
我们提出了一个连续时间模型的贝叶斯学习在双寡头市场。最初，市场对所提供的一种产品的价值是未知的。随着时间的推移，市场参与者会更多地了解产品的真正价值。公司设定价格以诱导人们对其产品进行试验。总体结果是公共信息。当代理人从其他人的实验中学习时，信息外部性就出现了。令人惊讶的是，信息外部性导致了过多的学习。买家不考虑他们的实验对其他买家的影响，而卖家则将买家进行的实验的收益内化。由于实验的社会成本没有适当地反映在均衡价格中，企业在市场上搭便车。卖方的价值函数表现出对信息的偏好，而买方则表现出信息厌恶。我们在这个双边学习模型中确定马尔可夫完美均衡价格和分配。的分析是有限数量的买家以及连续的买家。低效率的严重性是单调增加的买家数量。
We present a continuous-time model of Bayesian learning in a duopolistic market. Initially the value of one product offered is unknown to the market. The market participants learn more about the true value of the product as experimentation occurs over time. Firms set prices to induce experimentation with their product. The aggregate outcomes are public information. As agents learn from the experiments of others, informational externalities arise. Surprisingly, the informational externality leads to too much learning. Buyers do not consider the impact of their experimentation on other buyers while the sellers internalize the gains from experiments conducted by the buyers. The firms free ride on the market as the social costs of experiments are not appropriately reflected in the equilibrium prices. The value functions of the sellers display preference for information in contrast to the buyers who are information averse. We determine Markov Perfect Equilibrium prices and allocations in this two-sided learning model. The analysis is presented for a finite number of buyers as well as for a continuum of buyers. The severity of the inefficiency is shown to be monotonically increasing in the number of buyers.