Black-Box Side-Channel Attacks Highlight the Importance of Countermeasures - An Analysis of the Xilinx Virtex-4 and Virtex-5 Bitstream Encryption Mechanism

Black-Box Side-Channel Attacks Highlight the Importance of Countermeasures - An Analysis of the Xilinx Virtex-4 and Virtex-5 Bitstream Encryption Mechanism
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DOI:
10.1007/978-3-642-27954-6_1
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发表时间:
2012-02
期刊:
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影响因子:
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通讯作者:
A. Moradi;Markus Kasper;C. Paar
A. Moradi;Markus Kasper;C. Paar
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
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作者:
A. Moradi;Markus Kasper;C. Paar

文献摘要

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本文对Xilinx Virtex fpga提供的比特流加密机制进行了边信道分析。这项工作涵盖了我们对Virtex-4和Virtex-5家族的分析结果,表明只需适度的努力就可以完全破解加密机制。提出的结果提供了一个实际的现实世界分析的概述,并应帮助从业者判断实施侧信道对策的必要性。我们展示了对现成fpga的复杂攻击,远远超出了对8位AES s -box的教科书攻击。我们能够仅通过使用一次上电的测量值来执行密钥提取。访问密钥可以克隆和操纵设计,该设计已被加密以保护知识产权并防止欺诈。因此,目标产品面临着严重的威胁,如IP盗窃和更高级的攻击,如逆向工程或引入硬件木马。据我们所知,这是公开文献中首次报道的针对Xilinx Virtex-4和Virtex-5比特流加密的成功攻击。
This paper presents a side-channel analysis of the bitstream encryption mechanism provided by Xilinx Virtex FPGAs. This work covers our results analyzing the Virtex-4 and Virtex-5 family showing that the encryption mechanism can be completely broken with moderate effort. The presented results provide an overview of a practical real-world analysis and should help practitioners to judge the necessity to implement side-channel countermeasures. We demonstrate sophisticated attacks on off-the-shelf FPGAs that go far beyond schoolbook attacks on 8-bit AES S-boxes. We were able to perform the key extraction by using only the measurements of a single power-up. Access to the key enables cloning and manipulating a design, which has been encrypted to protect the intellectual property and to prevent fraud. As a consequence, the target product faces serious threats like IP theft and more advanced attacks such as reverse engineering or the introduction of hardware Trojans. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first successful attack against the bitstream encryption of Xilinx Virtex-4 and Virtex-5 reported in open literature.