Rank Order Tournaments and Incentive Alignment: The Effect on Firm Performance
Rank Order Tournaments and Incentive Alignment: The Effect on Firm Performance
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1095389
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发表时间：
2007-11
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jayant R. Kale;Ebru Reis;Anand Venkateswaran
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jayant R. Kale;Ebru Reis;Anand Venkateswaran
我们同时调查了基于晋升的锦标赛对副总裁的激励以及对副总裁和首席执行官(CEO)的基于股权(结盟)的激励对公司业绩的影响。我们发现，以CEO和VP之间的薪酬差距衡量的锦标赛激励措施与公司业绩呈正相关。当CEO临近退休时，这种关系更积极，当公司有新CEO时，这种关系不那么积极，当新CEO是局外人时，这种关系进一步减弱。我们的分析对我们所有激励措施的内生性以及锦标赛激励和公司业绩的几个替代衡量标准的修正是稳健的。
We investigate simultaneously the impact of promotion-based tournament incentives for VPs and equity-based (alignment) incentives for VPs and the chief executive officer (CEO) on firm performance. We find that tournament incentives, as measured by the pay differential between the CEO and VPs, relate positively to firm performance. The relation is more positive when the CEO nears retirement and less positive when the firm has a new CEO, and weakens further when the new CEO is an outsider. Our analysis is robust to corrections for endogeneity of all our incentive measures and to several alternative measures of tournament incentives and firm performance.