Mobility Costs, Frictional Unemployment, and Efficiency
Mobility Costs, Frictional Unemployment, and Efficiency
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DOI：
10.1086/261003
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发表时间：
1981-08
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
P. Diamond
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Diamond
在职位信息流不完善的情况下，职位空缺越多，失业人数越多，职位分配就可能变得更具吸引力。在口碑传播的情况下，这一条件就得到了推导。在这种情况下，稳态均衡是不有效的，即使所有代理人都是风险中性的，福利也会通过引入失业救济金而增加。通过这种方式，员工在接受工作时变得更加挑剔。
With imperfect job information flows, it is plausible that the distribution of job offerings becomes more attractive when there are more vacancies and more unemployed. With word-of-mouth communication, this condition is derived. Given this condition, steady-state equilibrium is not efficient, with welfare increased by the introduction of unemployment compensation even though all agents are risk neutral. In this way workers become more selective in the jobs they accept.