The impact of audit quality on real and accrual earnings management around IPOs
The impact of audit quality on real and accrual earnings management around IPOs
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.bar.2017.12.003
复制
发表时间：
2018-06-01
影响因子：
5.1
通讯作者：
Clacher, Iain
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Alhadab, Mohammad;Clacher, Iain
本文研究了审计质量与IPO公司盈余管理行为之间的关系。高质量的审计师对真实的盈余管理的影响已经在一些环境中进行了研究，例如SEO。然而，迄今为止，还没有关于高质量的审计师对围绕IPO的基于真实的活动的操纵的影响的研究。我们研究了英国1998年至2008年的首次公开募股，发现证据表明，高质量的审计师限制使用真实的活动操纵，发生通过管理的可自由支配的费用。我们还发现证据，与以前的研究一致，高质量的审计师约束操纵的可支配应计利润。重要的是，我们发现，由高质量的审计师审计的IPO公司进行基于销售的操纵，以管理在IPO年度末的盈利向上。因此，高质量审计师的存在不足以限制所有形式的盈余管理。
We examine the relation between audit quality and the earnings management activities of IPO firms. The impact of high quality auditors on real earnings management has been researched in a number of settings e.g. SEOs. However, to date, there has been no work on the effect of high quality auditors on real activities-based manipulation around IPOs. We examine UK IPOs between 1998 and 2008 and find evidence that high quality auditors constrain the use of real activities manipulation that occurs via the management of discretionary expenses. We also find evidence, consistent with prior research, that high quality auditors constrain the manipulation of discretionary accruals. Crucially, we find IPO firms audited by high quality auditors undertake sales-based manipulation in order to manage earnings upward at the end of the IPO year. The presence of high quality auditors is not, therefore, sufficient to constrain all forms of earnings management.