The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance
The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance
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债务在互动公司治理中的作用
DOI：
10.15779/z38bm76
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发表时间：
1995
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Daniels
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
George G. Triantis;R. Daniels
大多数公司治理文献都基于这样一个前提，即不同利益相关者群体的利益存在冲突，管理层的忠诚度更有可能被股东而不是其他任何群体所俘获。然而，利益相关者的利益集中在控制管理松弛的目标和非股权成分对公司决策有实质性的影响。虽然治理研究已经采取了早期的步骤，放弃其专注于公平为中心的解决方案，并确定存在于更广泛的利益相关者之间的相互依存关系，治理学者错过了互动的一个重要因素。利益相关者对其他人的行为做出反应，从而有助于控制松弛的集体利益。每个利益相关者都有一个了解公司的窗口，通过该窗口，它可以以比其他利益相关者更低的成本获取某种类型的信息。当利益相关者发现一个令人不满意的事态时，它的反应是选择退出或行使发言权。无论是行使发言权还是退出权，都可能迫使管理层纠正令人不满意的松懈状态。然而，更重要的是，一个利益相关者的退出为其他利益相关者提供了重要信息，至少其中一些人可能更有能力采取行动纠正这种松懈。本文描述了一个互动的公司治理系统，并提供了一个程式化的理论在这个系统中的贷款人的作用。这些贷款人和其他利益攸关方的利益分歧并不排除互动式治理，但它确实有可能减少这一进程的净效益。因此，作者确定了一些法律的和体制机制，有助于引导贷款人的努力，以实现遏制和纠正管理松懈的共同目标。因此，互动的角度允许新的解释现象，如债务契约，破产优先规则和贷款人责任法。例如，债务契约的定义和贷款协议中的违约事件增加了贷款人退出的可能性，即贷款人退出是由于懈怠而不是贷款人的机会主义，从而提高了退出的信息价值。破产优先规则鼓励在公司破产之前尽早退出，从而使剩余的利益相关者能够在公司的状况变得不可挽回之前采取行动。因此，债务契约和优先权规则提供了一个窗口，增加了贷款人退出的价值，促使纠正管理松弛。
Most of the corporate governance literature rests on a premise that the interests of various stakeholder groups conflict and that managerial loyalty is more likely to be captured by shareholders than any other constituency. Yet, stakeholder interests do converge in the objective of controlling managerial slack and non-equity constituents have substantial influence over firm decisions. Although the study of governance has taken early steps to abandon its preoccupation with equity-centered solutions and identify interdependencies existing among a broader range of stakeholders, governance scholars have missed an important element of interactivity. A stakeholder reacts to the actions of others and thereby contributes to the collective interest in controlling slack. Each stakeholder has a window on the firm through which it can acquire some type of information at lower cost than other stakeholders. When a stakeholder detects an unsatisfactory state of affairs, it reacts by choosing to exit or exercise voice. The exercise of either the voice or exit option may pressure management to correct the unsatisfactory state of slack. More to the point, however, a stakeholder's exit bears important information for other stakeholders, at least some of whom may be better placed to take action that corrects the slack. This Article describes an interactive system of corporate governance and provides a stylized theory of the role of lenders within this system. The divergence in the interests of these lenders and other stakeholders does not preclude interactive governance, but it does threaten to reduce the net benefits from the process. Therefore, the authors identify a number of legal and institutional mechanisms that help to channel the efforts of the lender toward the common goal of containing and correcting managerial slack. The interactive perspective thus permits new explanations for phenomena such as debt covenants, bankruptcy preference rules and lender liability laws. For example, the definition of debt covenants and events of default in lending agreements raise the likelihood that the lender exit is prompted by slack rather than lender opportunism and thereby enhances the informational value of the exit. Bankruptcy preference rules encourage early exit before the firm becomes insolvent, thereby enabling remaining stakeholders to take action before the firm's condition becomes irreparable. Thus, debt covenants and preference rules provide a window that increases the value of lender exit in prompting the correction of managerial slack.