Human Rights Without Foundations
Human Rights Without Foundations
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没有基础的人权
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.999874
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Raz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Raz
文章以格沃斯和格里芬的叙述为例，批评了人权实践中所理解的人权的叙述，这些实践将人权视为所有人因其人性而享有的权利。相反，它表明（与罗尔斯一样）人权对国家主权设定了限制，但批评罗尔斯将主权与合法权威混为一谈。由此产生的概念认为，人权与其他权利一样，取决于社会条件，特别是国际体系的性质。
Using the accounts of Gewirth and Griffin as examples, the article criticises accounts of human rights as those are understood in human rights practices, which regard them as rights all human beings have in virtue of their humanity. Instead it suggests that (with Rawls) human rights set the limits to the sovereignty of the state, but criticises Rawls conflation of sovereignty with legitimate authority. The resulting conception takes human rights, like other rights, to be contingent on social conditions, and in particular on the nature of the international system.