Introduction: Outright Belief and Degrees of Belief Introduction: Outright Belief and Degrees of Belief
Introduction: Outright Belief and Degrees of Belief Introduction: Outright Belief and Degrees of Belief
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简介：彻底的信仰和信仰程度 简介：彻底的信仰和信仰程度
DOI：
10.1111/j.1746-8361.2012.01306.x
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发表时间：
2012
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Ebert P
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作者：
Ebert P
我们有时认为信仰是一种断断续续的态度，我们要么坚持一个主张，要么不坚持。在其他时候，人们似乎很自然地认为信仰是有等级的东西。我相信我有两只手比我认为的美国首席执行官的平均收入是普通美国工人的200多倍，反过来，我认为美国首席执行官的平均收入是普通美国工人的200多倍，比我认为马洛里在1924年登上珠穆朗玛峰(珠穆朗玛峰)的强度更大。这样的考虑表明，命题至少可以根据我对它们进行投资的信念的强度进行部分排序。贝叶斯认识论往往走得更远，声称我投资于这些命题和其他命题的信念强度可以与介于0和1之间的实数值度相关联，1代表真理的确定性，0代表谬误的确定性，0.5代表完美不可知论。对于贝叶斯人来说，信仰度成为认知评估的基本目标，他们接着提供了一个关于如何理性监管的详细故事。对于贝叶斯人来说，一个人的整体鸽派状态可以通过一个以命题为论点并产生实数作为值的信念函数来捕捉。不可否认，这幅画有一些迷人之处，但它与老式的、断断续续的彻底信念概念并驾齐驱，令人颇为不安。赤裸裸的信仰到底是如何融入这幅图画的呢？一个自然的第一个想法是，完全的信仰应该简单地对应于某种适当的高度信仰。也就是说，当一个人的信任度超过某个阈值时，对一个命题的彻底信任将被“开启”，当一个人的信任度下降到该阈值以下时，它将被“关闭”。这有时被称为门槛观点或洛克命题(例如，见Foley，1992,2009)。尽管门槛观点最初很有吸引力，但正如本书中的一些论文所讨论的那样，它面临着一系列困难，包括拉尔夫·韦奇伍德和彼得·米尔恩的论文。在《彻头彻尾的信仰》一书中，韦奇伍德强调了门槛观点如何导致对彻头彻尾的信仰直观地服从的一致性和封闭性规范的违反。在《信念、信任度和断言》中
We sometimes think of belief as an on-off attitude that we either bear to a proposition or do not. Other times, it seems natural to think of belief as something graded. I believe that I have two hands more strongly than I believe that the average US CEO earns over 200 times as much as the average US worker and, in turn, I believe that the average US CEO earns over 200 times as much as the average US worker more strongly than I believe that Mallory reached the summit of Chomol-ungma (Mount Everest) in 1924. What considerations like this suggest is that propositions can at least be partially ordered according to the strength of belief that I invest in them. Bayesian epistemologists tend to go further than this, claiming that the strength of belief that I invest in these and other propositions can be associated with real numerical degrees between 0 and 1, with 1 representing certainty of truth, 0 representing certainty of falsehood and 0.5 representing perfect agnosticism. Degrees of belief, so understood, become the basic target of epistemic evaluation for Bayesians, who go on to provide a detailed story as to how they ought to be rationally policed.For the Bayesian, one's overall doxastic state can be captured by a degree of belief function that takes propositions as arguments and yields real numbers as values. There is something undeniably captivating about this picture, and yet it sits rather uneasily alongside the old-fashioned, on-off notion of outright belief. How exactly does outright belief fit into this picture? A natural first thought to have is that outright belief should simply correspond to some suitably high degree of belief. That is, outright belief in a proposition will be'switched on'when one's degree of belief exceeds some threshold and'switched off when one's degree of belief dips below that threshold. This is sometimes termed the threshold view or Lockean thesis (see, for instance, Foley, 1992, 2009). Despite its initial attractiveness, though, the threshold view faces a range of difficulties, as a number of the papers in this volume discuss, including those by Ralph Wedgwood and Peter Milne. In'Outright Belief'Wedgwood emphasizes how the threshold view leads to the violation of consistency and closure norms that outright belief is intuitively subject to. In'Belief, Degrees of Belief, and Assertion'