(In)secure Acoustic Mobile Authentication
(In)secure Acoustic Mobile Authentication
复制标题
DOI:
10.1109/tmc.2021.3053282
复制
发表时间:
2022-09
影响因子:
7.9
通讯作者:
Dianqi Han;Ang Li;Tao Li;Lili Zhang;Yan Zhang;Jiawei Li;Rui Zhang;Yanchao Zhang
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
Dianqi Han;Ang Li;Tao Li;Lili Zhang;Yan Zhang;Jiawei Li;Rui Zhang;Yanchao Zhang
Acoustic fingerprinting aims to identify a mobile device based on its internal microphone(s) and speaker(s) which are unique due to manufacturing imperfection. This paper seeks a thorough understanding of the (in)security of exploring acoustic fingerprints for achieving distributed mobile authentication. Our contributions are threefold. First, we present a new acoustic fingerprint-emulation attack and demonstrate that it is a common vulnerability of acoustic mobile authentication systems. Second, we propose a dynamic challenge-response defense to secure acoustic mobile authentication systems against the acoustic fingerprint-emulation attack. Finally, we thoroughly investigate existing acoustic fingerprinting schemes and identify the best option for accurate, secure, and deployable acoustic mobile authentication systems.