Bertrand Competition for Inputs and Walrasian Outcomes
Bertrand Competition for Inputs and Walrasian Outcomes
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输入和瓦尔拉斯结果的伯特兰竞争
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发表时间：
1988
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通讯作者：
D. Stahl
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作者：
D. Stahl
商家从供应商那里获得库存并转售给消费者的做市行为，被建模为一个两阶段定价博弈，其中投入是赢家通吃的竞争(与固定容量模型相反)。Re是一个唯一的子博弈完美纳什均衡(SPNE)，对于弹性需求是Walr亚洲的，对于非弹性需求是非Walrasian的。另一方面，当商家首先向消费者出售远期合同，然后竞争供应时，独特的SPNE总是沃尔斯式的。因此，作者建立了一个均衡模型，其中Walrasian价格不是来自虚拟拍卖商的善意行为，而是来自商人的最优定价行为。美国经济协会版权所有1988年。
Market making by merchants, who obtain stock from suppliers and resell it to con sumers, is modeled as a two-stage pricing game with winner-take-all c ompetition for the inputs (in contrast to fixed-capacity models). The re is a unique, subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) which is Walr asian for elastic demand and non-Walrasian for inelastic demand. Alte rnatively, when merchants first sell forward contracts to consumers a nd then compete for supplies, the unique SPNE is always Walrasian. Th us, the author has an equilibrium model in which Walrasian price aris es not from the benevolent actions of a fictitious auctioneer, but fr om optimal price-setting behavior of merchants. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.