The Balance Between Small and Large: Effects of a Double-Majority System on Voting Power in the European Union
The Balance Between Small and Large: Effects of a Double-Majority System on Voting Power in the European Union
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DOI：
10.2307/2600925
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发表时间：
1995-09
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
M. Hosli
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Hosli
1995年初，欧盟扩大了三个国家：奥地利、芬兰和瑞典。考虑到对欧盟机构平衡的影响，以及未来可能有更多国家加入欧盟，目前有不同的建议要改变决策体系，使其更透明，更充分地代表成员国的人口规模。这个问题肯定会在1996年《马斯特里赫特条约》审查会议的框架内进行激烈辩论。目前的建议之一是在欧盟理事会（以前的部长理事会）建立双多数投票制度，要求该机构内成员国及其人口的多数。另一个目标是引入两院制。本文分析了采用双多数投票制度和引入两院制结构对成员国在欧盟决策过程中的量化影响。双多数要求下的投票通过一个简单的博弈来建模，相对投票权由（复合）班扎夫权力指数计算。
In the beginning of 1995, the European Union (EU) has been enlarged by three countries: Austria, Finland, and Sweden. In view of the implications on the EU's institutional balance and the possible accession of more states in the future, different proposals are currently made to change the system of decision making to one that is more transparent and that more adequately represents member-states' population sizes. The issue will certainly be intensely debated in the framework of the 1996 Review Conference of the Maastricht Treaty. One of the current suggestions aims at establishing a double-majority voting system in the Council of the EU—formerly the Council of Ministers—requiring a majority of both member-states and their populations within that institution. Another one aims at introducing a bicameral system. This article analyzes what effects the resort to a double-majority voting system and the introduction of a bicameral structure would have in terms of the member-states' quantitative influence in the EU's decision-making process. Voting under the double-majority requirement is modeled by a simple game and relative voting power calculated by a (composite) Banzhaf power index.