The struggle for South Yemen
The struggle for South Yemen
复制标题
南也门的斗争
DOI:
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发表时间:
1984
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
R. Serjeant
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
R. Serjeant
Aden had long been regarded as an important strategic asset in the maintenance of Britain’s position as a world power. As late as May 1956, a junior minister, Lord Lloyd, had made clear that ‘for the foreseeable future it would not be reasonable or sensible or in the interests of the Colony’s inhabitants for them to aspire to any aim beyond that of a considerable degree of internal self-government’. The colony’s strategic importance was such that the government could not ‘foresee the possibility of any fundamental relaxation of their responsibilities for the Colony’. 1 Paradoxically, as British power declined, this importance actually increased. Evicted from Egypt and Iraq, with Cyprus and Kenya uncertain, the Aden base became increasingly important. In 1960 Aden replaced Cyprus as headquarters of Middle East Command and it was described in the 1962 Defence White Paper, along with Singapore and Britain itself, as one of three vital permanent military bases. It was regarded as the key to the defence of British interests in the Middle East, the Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The problem was, however, that the British position was coming under increasing challenge from Arab nationalism, both in the colony itself and in its hinterland, the Arab protectorates that made up the Federation of South Arabia. There was every confidence, however, that by force and fraud this challenge could be contained and that, in the words of a former Governor, Sir Tom Hickinbotham, the security of Aden would be ‘maintained as long as Britain remains great’. 2