Insurgency and War in Nigeria, Regional Fracture and the Fight Against Boko Haram by Akali Omeni, London, I.B Tauris, 2020, 270 pp., £90 (HB), ISBN: 978-1-7883-1128-1
Insurgency and War in Nigeria, Regional Fracture and the Fight Against Boko Haram by Akali Omeni, London, I.B Tauris, 2020, 270 pp., £90 (HB), ISBN: 978-1-7883-1128-1
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《尼日利亚的叛乱与战争、地区分裂与对抗博科圣地》作者：Akali Omeni，伦敦，I.B Tauris，2020 年，270 页，90 英镑 (HB)，ISBN：978-1-7883-1128-1
DOI：
10.1080/13698249.2021.2003476
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发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Toltica S
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Toltica S
博科圣地最初被低估为一群“乌合之众战斗人员”，但在过去十年中，它已成为尼日利亚东北部和乍得湖盆地地区民众和安全部队的真正威胁。据报告，冲突已造成 40,000 多人死亡（ACLED 2020），另有 250 万人流离失所，其中 170 万人流离失所发生在尼日利亚东北部（UNOWAS 2019）。在区域不安全的背景下，有价值的研究主要集中在尼日利亚叛乱的历史和原因以及 9/11 后的反恐战略（Hentz 和 Solomon 2017）。然而，关于该小组的战术演变和作战性质的研究却很少。阿卡利·奥梅尼（Akali Omeni）关于叛乱和战争的书在填补这一知识空白方面迈出了重要一步，它对博科圣地的军事和意识形态演变、促进这些进程的环境以及尼日利亚安全部队反叛乱挑战进行了翔实且有价值的分析。本书分为四个主要部分。前三个重点关注叛乱分子、环境和军事行动，追踪威胁的演变，讨论该组织的意识形态、军事能力和剥夺尼日利亚军队传统优势的战略。第四部分重点关注反叛乱挑战，讨论了最佳实践和建议，认为这种形式的战争对于面对叛乱分子的“头重脚轻”的国家军队来说是有问题的，而叛乱分子更擅长“自下而上”的战争。本书的第一部分揭示了该组织如何模糊宗教和政治话语，以赢得尼日利亚最贫困群体和 almajirai 宗教学校学生的普遍支持。在优素福富有魅力的领导下，借助经济和基于信仰的软实力影响力，例如提供住房、食物和小型工作报酬，会员人数不断增加（第 21-23 页）。继 2009 年与尼日利亚安全部队发生首次暴力冲突以及优素福法外处决之后，奥梅尼探讨了博科圣地最有影响力的领导人：阿布·谢考 (Abu Shekau)、马曼·努尔 (Mamman Nur) 和伊斯兰国任命的领导人以及优素福的儿子阿布·穆斯 (Abu Mus) 的阿布·巴纳维 (Ab al-Barnawi) 领导下的变化和组织分裂。第二章和第三章以及后面的第六章和第九章附录探讨了不同的领导人物及其对博科圣地成员资格和分裂过程的影响。谢考批评优素福的自由主义做法以及神学与暴力之间的优柔寡断，转向以日益激进的意识形态为基础的长期战争的丛林战争战略（第43页）。他的想法对于“以人为本”来说过于极端，行为残忍
Initially underestimated as a group of ‘ragtag combatants’, Boko Haram has in the past decade emerged as a genuine threat to populations and security forces across both Northeast Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin region. More than 40,000 fatalities have been reported as a result of the conflict (ACLED 2020), and a further 2.5 million people displaced, with 1.7 million of these displacements occurring in Northeast Nigeria (UNOWAS 2019). In this context of regional insecurity, valuable research has mostly focused on the history and causes fuelling insurgencies in Nigeria and counterterrorist strategies post 9/11 (Hentz and Solomon 2017). However, little research has been undertaken on the tactical evolution and operational nature of the group. Akali Omeni’s book on insurgency and war takes an important step in the overdue filling of this knowledge gap, by offering a well-informed, valuable analysis of Boko Haram’s military and ideological evolution, the environment facilitating these processes, and Nigerian security forces counterinsurgency challenges.The book is divided into four major parts. The first three–which focus on the insurgent, the environment and the military campaign–trace the evolution of the threat, addressing the group’s ideology, military capabilities and the strategies that have deprived the Nigerian army of its traditional advantages. The fourth, which focuses on the counterinsurgency challenge, discusses best practices and recommendations, arguing that this form of war is problematic for ‘top-heavy’state militaries facing insurgents better-positioned to excel at ‘bottom-up’warfare. The first part of the book sheds new light on the ways in which the group has sought to blur religious and political discourse in order to wrest popular support among Nigeria’s most underprivileged and the almajirai madrassa pupils. Under Yusuf’s charismatic leadership, membership was increased with the help of economic and faith-based soft power influence, for example, provision of shelter, food and payment for small jobs (pp. 21–23). Following the first violent clashes with Nigerian security forces and Yusuf’s extrajudicial killing in 2009, Omeni explores changes and organisational cleavages under Boko Haram’s most influential leaders: Abu Shekau, Mamman Nur and IS appointed and Yusuf’s son Abu Mus’ ab al-Barnawi. Different leadership personalities and their implications for Boko Haram membership and splintering processes are explored in chapters two and three, as well as later in chapter six and the annexe to chapter nine. Shekau criticised Yusuf’s liberal approach and the indecision between theology and violence, shifting to a bush war strategy of protracted warfare underpinned by an increasingly radical ideology (p. 43). His ideas–too extreme for a ‘people centric’IS, ruthless conduct