Social penalty promotes cooperation in a cooperative society.
Social penalty promotes cooperation in a cooperative society.
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DOI：
10.1038/srep12797
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发表时间：
2015-08-04
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
Yoshimura J
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ito H;Yoshimura J
人类社会为什么会有如此发达的合作关系，是生物科学和人文科学一直没有解决的问题。博弈论中的大量研究表明，在非合作博弈中，自私行为通常比合作行为占主导地位，而合作只能在非常有限的条件下进化。这些研究询问合作的起源;合作是否可以在一群自私的个体中进化。在本文中，而不是问合作的起源，我们认为在一个小的合作社会的合作的增强。我们要问的是，在一个设计了社会惩罚的小型合作社会中，合作行为是否会得到进一步的促进。我们分析了引入社会惩罚的鹰鸽博弈和囚徒困境。然后，我们将其扩展到一般的非合作博弈。研究结果表明，如果进一步施加惩罚，合作是普遍青睐。我们从社会的道德、法律、规章制度等方面来讨论当前的结果，例如，犯罪学和交通违规
Why cooperation is well developed in human society is an unsolved question in biological and human sciences. Vast studies in game theory have revealed that in non-cooperative games selfish behavior generally dominates over cooperation and cooperation can be evolved only under very limited conditions. These studies ask the origin of cooperation; whether cooperation can evolve in a group of selfish individuals. In this paper, instead of asking the origin of cooperation, we consider the enhancement of cooperation in a small already cooperative society. We ask whether cooperative behavior is further promoted in a small cooperative society in which social penalty is devised. We analyze hawk-dove game and prisoner’s dilemma introducing social penalty. We then expand it for non-cooperative games in general. The results indicate that cooperation is universally favored if penalty is further imposed. We discuss the current result in terms of the moral, laws, rules and regulations in a society, e.g., criminology and traffic violation.