Enumerating Privacy Leaks in DNS Data Collected above the Recursive

Enumerating Privacy Leaks in DNS Data Collected above the Recursive
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枚举递归以上收集的 DNS 数据中的隐私泄漏

DOI:
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发表时间:
2017
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
J. Heidemann
J. Heidemann
中科院分区:
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文献类型:
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作者:
Basileal Imana;A. Korolova;J. Heidemann

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-与任何由来自人们的行为的数据组成的信息系统一样,DNS数据容易受到隐私风险的影响。在DNS中,用户通过递归解析器向权威服务器进行查询。在递归解析器下面(或在其中)收集的数据直接暴露用户,因此大多数以前的DNS数据共享都集中在递归解析器之上的查询上。在递归解析器上收集的数据在很大程度上被视为构成最小的隐私风险,因为递归解析器通常为许多用户聚合Traffic,从而隐藏他们的身份并混合他们的traffic。尽管这一假设被广泛提出,但据我们所知,它尚未得到证实。在这篇文章中,我们重新检验了递归解析器上的dns traffic的这一假设。首先,我们展示了两种信息出现在递归解析器上方的查询名称中:IP地址和敏感域名,例如与健康、政治、个人或生活方式信息有关的信息。其次,我们使用2017年4月以来48小时的B-Root数据,检查了这些潜在敏感名称在Root Dns Traffic中出现的频率。
—As with any information system consisting of data derived from people’s actions, DNS data is vulnerable to privacy risks. In DNS, users make queries through recursive resolvers to authoritative servers. Data collected below (or in) the recursive resolver directly exposes users, so most prior DNS data sharing focuses on queries above the recursive resolver. Data collected above a recursive resolver has largely been seen as posing a minimal privacy risk since recursive resolvers typically aggregate traffic for many users, thereby hiding their identity and mixing their traffic. Although this assumption is widely made, to our knowledge it has not been verified. In this paper we re-examine this assumption for DNS traffic above the recursive resolver. First, we show that two kinds of information appear in query names above the recursive resolver: IP addresses and sensitive domain names, such as those pertaining to health, politics, or personal or lifestyle information. Second, we examine how often these classes of potentially sensitive names appear in Root DNS traffic, using 48 hours of B-Root data from April 2017.
蒽环类药物:当好事变坏时。
DOI: 10.1007/s12012-007-0017-1
发表时间: 2007
影响因子: 3.2
作者:
Minotti,Giorgio;Sarvazyan,Narine
通讯作者: Sarvazyan,Narine