Naïve Cronyism and Neutral Competence: Patronage, Performance, and Policy Agreement in Executive Appointments
Naïve Cronyism and Neutral Competence: Patronage, Performance, and Policy Agreement in Executive Appointments
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天真的任人唯亲和中立能力：行政任命中的赞助、绩效和政策协议
DOI：
10.1093/jopart/muu016
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Gary E. Hollibaugh
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Gary E. Hollibaugh
许多官僚主义文献表明，在为官僚机构配备人员时，高管们希望代理人既能响应他们的政治需求，又具备履行其指令所需的能力。然而，体制上的障碍- -例如立法确认的要求- -即使不是不可能，也可能使追求反应能力战略变得困难。在这里，我考察了一种允许信息不完善的机构存在的官僚任命模式。我表明，当需要立法同意时，通常需要在意识形态与任命权或代理绩效（或两者兼而有之）之间进行权衡，以确保立法批准。对于单边任命而言，这种动态并不存在。最后，使用一个包含联邦项目经理的意识形态、联邦项目的绩效以及项目经理是否是任职者的数据集，我进行了一系列支持模型预测的实证测试。
Much of the bureaucratic literature suggests that, when staffing the bureaucracy, executives want agents who are both responsive to their political needs and possess the competence needed to fulfill their directives. However, institutional barriers — such as the requirement for legislative confirmation — exist that may make pursuing a strategy of responsive competence difficult, if not impossible. Here, I examine a model of bureaucratic appointments that allows for informationally imperfect agencies. I show that when legislative assent is required, tradeoffs between ideology and either patronage or agency performance — or both — are often required to ensure legislative confirmation. The same dynamics are not present for unilateral appointments. Finally, using a dataset that incorporates the ideologies of federal program managers, the performance of federal programs, and whether program managers were patronage appointees, I conduct a series of empirical tests that support the model’s predictions.