Knapsack Voting for Participatory Budgeting
Knapsack Voting for Participatory Budgeting
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DOI：
10.1145/3340230
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发表时间：
2019-08-01
影响因子：
1.2
通讯作者：
Aitamurto, Tanja
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Goel, Ashish;Krishnaswamy, Anilesh K.;Aitamurto, Tanja
我们解决在参与式预算背景下汇总选民偏好的问题。我们仔细研究了目前在实践中使用的投票方法，强调了其缺点，并引入了一种针对这种情况量身定制的新颖方案，我们称之为“背包投票”。我们研究了它的战略属性——我们表明它在自然效用模型下是策略证明的（由结果和选民真实偏好之间的 l(1) 距离给出的负效用），并且在一般可加效用下是“部分”策略证明的。我们将背包投票扩展到更一般的收入、赤字或盈余环境，并证明了类似的策略证明结果。为了进一步证明我们计划的适用性，我们讨论了该计划在我们与全国许多城市的地方政府机构合作部署的数字投票平台上的实施情况。根据收集的投票数据，我们提供了背包式投票在实践中效果良好的经验证据。
We address the question of aggregating the preferences of voters in the context of participatory budgeting. We scrutinize the voting method currently used in practice, underline its drawbacks, and introduce a novel scheme tailored to this setting, which we call "Knapsack Voting." We study its strategic properties-we show that it is strategy-proof under a natural model of utility (a dis-utility given by the l(1) distance between the outcome and the true preference of the voter) and "partially" strategy-proof under general additive utilities. We extend Knapsack Voting to more general settings with revenues, deficits, or surpluses and prove a similar strategy-proofness result. To further demonstrate the applicability of our scheme, we discuss its implementation on the digital voting platform that we have deployed in partnership with the local government bodies in many cities across the nation. From voting data thus collected, we present empirical evidence that Knapsack Voting works well in practice.