The Generalized Theory of Transfers and Welfare: Bilateral Transfers in a Multilateral World
The Generalized Theory of Transfers and Welfare: Bilateral Transfers in a Multilateral World
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转移与福利的广义理论：多边世界中的双边转移
DOI：
10.7916/d8445x5z
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发表时间：
1983
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
T. Hatta
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Bhagwati;Richard A. Brecher;T. Hatta
保罗·萨缪尔森（Paul Samuelson，1952，1954）关于转移问题的经典论文解决了两个独立的分析问题：转移对贸易条件的“积极”影响；以及转移对捐赠者和接受者的福利影响。从那时起，大量的文献都是在实证分析的基础上发展起来的。虽然萨缪尔森 (Samuelson, 1954) 本人扩展了 2 x 2 x 2 自由贸易分析以考虑关税和运输成本，但随后的作者分析了该模型的其他扩展：例如，考虑到萨缪尔森 (Samuelson, 1971) 中的休闲品等非贸易商品；或 John Chipman (1974) 和 Ronald Jones (1970, 1975) 中的一般非贸易商品。然而值得注意的是，转移支付的福利分析并没有与这些发展同步。由于 Wassily Leontief (1936) 提出了来自国外的贫困化转移的例子，而 Samuelson (1947) 认为该例子需要市场不稳定，因此垄断注意力的主张是，只要世界市场稳定（瓦尔拉斯意义上的），自由贸易版本中传统 2 x 2 x 2 模型中的转移就不能使接受者贫困化或使捐助者富裕。有趣的是，萨缪尔森（Samuelson，1954）确实将积极分析扩展到包括关税，但他并没有继续询问转移接受者的贫困化（以及因此在两国模型中捐助者的对称致富）现在是否可以与市场稳定相一致。最近，转移的福利分析已扩展到两个不同的方向，这两个方向显然无关，并且都得出这样的结论：尽管市场稳定，但来自国外的转移可能会导致贫困（并且捐助者可能会改善其福利）。得出这一结论的一个途径是引入转移过程之外的第三个经济主体（或国家）。哈里·约翰逊在 1960 年分析贸易政策与收入分配之间相互作用的论文的附录中，讨论了开放经济中两个要素收入阶层（资本和劳动力）之间福利矛盾再分配的可能性，从而提供了一种可以解释为在捐赠者和接受者都完全专业化于单一不同要素所有权的情况下对三代理人转移问题的处理方法。 David Gale (1974) 在一篇重要论文中也对三主体转移问题进行了独立分析，使用了给定商品禀赋和固定消费系数的限制性模型。2 Brecher 和 Bhagwati *Bhagwati：哥伦比亚大学经济系，纽约，NY 10027；布雷彻：渥太华卡尔顿大学经济系，ON KIS 5B6； Hatta：约翰霍普金斯大学政治经济学系，巴尔的摩，马里兰州 21218。我们感谢国家科学基金会，拨款号：21218。 524718，用于本文基础研究的部分财政支持。这篇论文是 1981-82 年 Brecher 和 Hatta 访问哥伦比亚大学时撰写的。感谢来自 John Chipman、Avinash Dixit、Jacques Dreze、Robert Feenstra、Jacob Frenkel、Ronald Jones、Murray Kemp、Andreu Mas-Colell、Michael Mussa、John Riley、Lars Svensson 和 Robert Willig、匿名审稿人以及来自伯克利、哈佛、明尼苏达、罗切斯特、芝加哥和加州大学洛杉矶分校的研讨会参与者的有益评论和建议。 “在本论文提交出版并在罗切斯特发表后，我们的注意力被这个附录吸引了，罗纳德·琼斯的一名学生注意到了它。随后，我们从矢野诚那里得知，伊藤元茂指出了小宫龙太郎和志月（1967）的一篇重要的相关论文，其中约翰逊情况的条件（11）预见了我们下面的等式（12）。我们很高兴这两份参考文献引起了我们的注意。 2 Gale 构建了一个例子，其中捐赠者与接受者一起致富。此外，这立即意味着反向转移将是错误的
Paul Samuelson's (1952, 1954) classic papers on the transfer problem addressed two separate analytical issues: the "positive" effect of a transfer on the terms of trade; and the welfare effect of the transfer on the donor and the recipient. Since then, a considerable body of literature has grown up on the positive analysis. While Samuelson (1954) himself had extended the 2 x 2 x 2 free trade analysis to allow for tariffs and transport costs, subsequent writers have analyzed other extensions of the model: for example, to allow for nontraded goods as with leisure in Samuelson (1971); or general nontraded goods in John Chipman (1974) and Ronald Jones (1970, 1975). Remarkably, however, the welfare analysis of transfers has not paralleled these developments. Since Wassily Leontief (1936) produced an example of immiserizing transfer from abroad and Samuelson (1947) argued that the example required market instability, the proposition that has monopolized attention has been that a transfer in the conventional 2 x 2 x 2 model in its free trade version cannot immiserize the recipient or enrich the donor as long as world markets are stable (in the Walras sense). Interestingly, Samuelson (1954), who did extend the positive analysis to include tariffs, did not go on to ask whether immiserization of the transfer recipient (and hence symmetrically enrichment of the donor in a two-country model) could now arise consistent with market stability. Recently, the welfare analysis of transfers has been extended in two different directions, both apparently unconnected, and both yielding the conclusion that transfers from abroad can be immiserizing (and that the donor may improve its welfare) despite market stability. One route to this conclusion has been the introduction of a third economic agent (or country) that is outside of the transfer process. In the Appendix of his 1960 paper analyzing the interaction between trade policy and income distribution, Harry Johnson discussed the possibility of welfareparadoxical redistribution between two factor-income classes (capital and labor) in an open economy, thereby providing what can be interpreted as a treatment of the threeagent transfer problem for the case in which donor and recipient are both completely specialized in the ownership of a single different factor.' An independent analysis of the three-agent transfer problem, using a restrictive model with given endowments of goods and fixed coefficients in consumption, was also undertaken in an important paper by David Gale (1974).2 Brecher and Bhagwati *Bhagwati: Department of Economics, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027; Brecher: Department of Economics, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON KIS 5B6; Hatta: Department of Political Economy, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD 21218. We thank the National Science Foundation, grant no. 524718, for partial financial support of the research underlying this paper. The paper was written when Brecher and Hatta were visiting Columbia University, 1981-82. Gratefully acknowledged are helpful comments and suggestions from John Chipman, Avinash Dixit, Jacques Dreze, Robert Feenstra, Jacob Frenkel, Ronald Jones, Murray Kemp, Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael Mussa, John Riley, Lars Svensson, and Robert Willig, from anonymous referees, and from seminar participants at Berkeley, Harvard, Minnesota, Rochester, Chicago and the University of California-Los Angeles. 'After the present paper was submitted for publication, and following its presentation at Rochester, our attention was drawn to this Appendix, which was noticed by a student of Ronald Jones. Subsequently, we learned from Makoto Yano that Motoshige Itoh had pointed out an important related paper by Ryuotaro Komiya and T. Shizuki (1967), whose condition (11) for the Johnson case anticipated our equation (12) below. We are grateful for having both of these references brought to our attention. 2 Gale constructs an example in which the donor is enriched along with the recipient. Furthermore, this immediately implies that a reverse transfer will immis-