A Computational Model of Non-Cooperation in Natural Language Dialogue
A Computational Model of Non-Cooperation in Natural Language Dialogue
复制标题
自然语言对话中的非合作计算模型
DOI：
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复制
发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Brian Plüss
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Brian Plüss
会话研究中的一个常见假设是，参与者充分合作，以最大限度地提高交流的有效性，确保交流的畅通。即使在参与者的个人目标不一致的情况下，这一假设仍然存在：他们可能在追求自己的议程时采取战略性行动，但仍然会遵守一些语言规范或惯例，这些规范或惯例是被语言使用者社区默许的。
然而，在自然发生的对话中，参与者经常偏离这些规范，例如，提出不适当的问题，避免提供适当的答案，或自愿提供与对话无关的信息。这些都是我们所说的语言不合作的例子。
本文对对话中的语言不合作现象进行了系统的研究。对于特定的活动，在特定的文化背景和特定的时间，该方法通过明确哪些语言行为是适当的来进行。这就产生了一套规则：全球对话游戏。然后，不合作被衡量为参与者的行动不符合这些规则的情况。对话游戏是根据话语义务正式定义的。根据对话历史，参与者应在对话中的给定点执行这些操作。在这方面，不合作等同于参与方未能履行其义务。
我们提出了语言不合作的一般定义，并给出了一个政治采访对话的具体实例。在后者的基础上，我们提出了一种经验方法，该方法涉及一种人工标注面试记录的编码方案。每个参与者的合作程度是通过将带注释的文字记录与政治采访对话游戏中的规则进行对比来自动确定的。该方法在广播政治访谈语料库上进行了评估，并在同一语料库上测试了与人的判断的相关性。
此外，我们描述了一个会话代理模型，该模型将上述概念和机制合并为其对话管理器的一部分。这允许产生对话，其中代理人通过控制他们倾向于他们的私人目标而不是履行他们的话语义务的频率来表现出不同程度的合作。
A common assumption in the study of conversation is that participants fully cooperate in order to maximise the effectiveness of the exchange and ensure communication flow. This assumption persists even in situations in which the private goals of the participants are at odds: they may act strategically pursuing their agendas, but will still adhere to a number of linguistic norms or conventions which are implicitly accepted by a community of language users.
However, in naturally occurring dialogue participants often depart from such norms, for instance, by asking inappropriate questions, by avoiding to provide adequate answers or by volunteering information that is not relevant to the conversation. These are examples of what we call linguistic non-cooperation.
This thesis presents a systematic investigation of linguistic non-cooperation in dialogue. Given a specific activity, in a specific cultural context and time, the method proceeds by making explicit which linguistic behaviours are appropriate. This results in a set of rules: the global dialogue game. Non-cooperation is then measured as instances in which the actions of the participants are not in accordance with these rules. The dialogue game is formally defined in terms of discourse obligations. These are actions that participants are expected to perform at a given point in the dialogue based on the dialogue history. In this context, non-cooperation amounts to participants failing to act according to their obligations.
We propose a general definition of linguistic non-cooperation and give a specific instance for political interview dialogues. Based on the latter, we present an empirical method which involves a coding scheme for the manual annotation of interview transcripts. The degree to which each participant cooperates is automatically determined by contrasting the annotated transcripts with the rules in the dialogue game for political interviews. The approach is evaluated on a corpus of broadcast political interviews and tested for correlation with human judgement on the same corpus.
Further, we describe a model of conversational agents that incorporates the concepts and mechanisms above as part of their dialogue manager. This allows for the generation of conversations in which the agents exhibit varying degrees of cooperation by controlling how often they favour their private goals instead of discharging their discourse obligations.
DOI：
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
Languages and Cultures Research Series XII(The Faculty of Languages and Cultures, Kyushu Univ.)
影响因子：
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作者：
大津隆広 (単著);大津隆広 (共編・単箸);Takahiro Otsu;Takahiro Otsu;大津隆広(単著);大津隆広(共編・単著);大津隆広 (単著);Takahiro Otsu
通讯作者：
Takahiro Otsu
哲学与语言
DOI：
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
Shouwado
影响因子：
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作者：
T.Okamura;Sugita Masaki
通讯作者：
Sugita Masaki