A bi-level model for the design of dynamic electricity tariffs with demand-side flexibility
A bi-level model for the design of dynamic electricity tariffs with demand-side flexibility
复制标题
具有需求侧灵活性的动态电价设计的双层模型
DOI：
10.1007/s00500-022-07038-3
复制
发表时间：
2022
期刊：
影响因子：
4.1
通讯作者：
S. Khodaparasti
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Beraldi;S. Khodaparasti
研究了具有需求侧灵活性的电力定价问题。一个聚合器和Prosumers联盟内的相互作用建模的Stackelberg游戏和制定为一个数学的双层计划，聚合器和Prosumer，分别发挥作用的上下决策者的目标相冲突。聚合器通过优化供应策略以最大化利润为目标建立定价方案，产消者通过调度灵活的负荷和管理家庭能源系统以最小化电费来对价格信号做出反应。这个问题是解决了一个启发式的方法，利用特定的模型结构。在一个真实的测试案例上进行了数值试验。研究结果为利益相关者提供了翔实的管理见解，强调了聚合者和产消者的突出作用。
This paper addresses the electricity pricing problem with demand-side flexibility. The interaction between an aggregator and the prosumers within a coalition is modeled by a Stackelberg game and formulated as a mathematical bi-level program where the aggregator and the prosumer, respectively, play the role of upper and lower decision makers with conflicting goals. The aggregator establishes the pricing scheme by optimizing the supply strategy with the aim of maximizing the profit, prosumers react to the price signals by scheduling the flexible loads and managing the home energy system to minimize the electricity bill. The problem is solved by a heuristic approach which exploits the specific model structure. Some numerical experiments have been carried out on a real test case. The results provide the stakeholders with informative managerial insights underlining the prominent roles of aggregator and prosumers.