Secure Device Trust Bootstrapping Against Collaborative Signal Modification Attacks
Secure Device Trust Bootstrapping Against Collaborative Signal Modification Attacks
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DOI：
10.1109/infocom53939.2023.10229007
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发表时间：
2023-05
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Xiaochan Xue;Shucheng Yu;Min Song
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Xiaochan Xue;Shucheng Yu;Min Song
在新兴的无线和移动应用中，经常需要在没有事先共享的机密的无线设备之间进行引导安全。解决这一问题的一个很有前途的方法是利用带内物理层射频(RF)信号来建立认证密钥，因为它具有高效率和高可用性。然而，现有的带内认证密钥协商(AKA)协议大多容易受到中间人(MITM)攻击，MITM攻击可以通过修改空中传输的无线信号来发起。通过湮灭合法信号和注入恶意信号，信号修改攻击者能够完全控制通信通道和欺骗受害者无线设备。解决此类攻击的最先进(SOTA)技术需要额外的辅助硬件或仅限于单个攻击者。本文提出了一种新的带内安全自举技术，可以阻止合谋的信号修改攻击者。与SOTA解决方案不同，我们的设计与商用设备兼容，不需要额外的硬件。我们实现这一点的基础是每个设备的内部随机性，这对攻击者来说是不可预测的。对RF信号的任何修改都将以高概率被检测到。广泛的安全分析和在USRP平台上的实验证明了我们的设计在各种攻击策略下的有效性。
Bootstrapping security among wireless devices without prior-shared secrets is frequently demanded in emerging wireless and mobile applications. One promising approach for this problem is to utilize in-band physical-layer radio-frequency (RF) signals for authenticated key establishment because of the efficiency and high usability. However, existing in-band authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocols are mostly vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks, which can be launched by modifying the transmitted wireless signals over the air. By annihilating legitimate signals and injecting malicious signals, signal modification attackers are able to completely control the communication channels and spoof victim wireless devices. State-of-the-art (SOTA) techniques addressing such attacks require additional auxiliary hardware or are limited to single attackers. This paper proposes a novel in-band security bootstrapping technique that can thwart colluding signal modification attackers. Different from SOTA solutions, our design is compatible with commodity devices without requiring additional hardware. We achieve this based on the internal randomness of each device that is unpredictable to attackers. Any modification to RF signals will be detected with high probabilities. Extensive security analysis and experimentation on the USRP platform demonstrate the effectiveness of our design under various attack strategies.