Ambiguity and Vagueness in Legal Interpretation
Ambiguity and Vagueness in Legal Interpretation
复制标题
法律解释中的歧义和模糊
DOI：
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199572120.013.0010
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发表时间：
2010
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
Ralf Poscher
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ralf Poscher
模糊性和歧义性是法律的解释理论的核心问题。本文首先界定了模糊性和模糊性，并将其与相关现象如法律的表述的一般性联系起来（1）。模糊是一种多方面的语言现象，可以沿着三个方面加以系统化：个体性与分类性的模糊，程度性与组合性的模糊，语义性与语用性的模糊。对于法律来说，实用主义的准确性似乎具有特殊的重要性（2）。关于解释的起源和解释，不同的解释方法分为逻辑解释、本体解释、认识解释和语义解释，其中认识解释和语义解释与解释的法律的理论关系最密切（3）。最后一节认为，法律的模糊性并不威胁到法律的解释和法治价值的正确理解。然而，对于一些建议的“诚实”的价值观，它是谨慎的。然而，它看到了模糊性在降低决策成本方面的价值，这不能完全被模糊概念的其他语义特征所容纳，如一般性（4）。
Vagueness and ambiguity are key problems in theories of legal interpretation. The article first delimits vagueness and ambiguity and sets it into relation to related phenomena like the generality of legal expressions (1). Vagueness proves to be a multi-faceted phenomenon which can be systematised along three distinctions: vagueness of individuation and classification, degree and combinatory vagueness, and semantic and pragmatic vagueness. For law pragmatic vagueness seems of specific import (2.). As for the origins and accounts of vagueness the different approaches are sorted into logic, ontic, epistemic and semantic accounts with epistemic and semantic accounts showing the closest relations to legal theories of interpretation (3.). The last section argues that vagueness is not a threat to legal interpretation and rule of law values properly understood. It is cautious, though, with regard to some suggested values of vagueness. However, it sees a value of vagueness in reducing decision costs, which cannot be completely accommodated by other semantic features of vague concepts like generality (4.).