Core-selecting package auctions
Core-selecting package auctions
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DOI：
10.1007/s00182-007-0100-7
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发表时间：
2008-03
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
Robert W. Day;Paul R. Milgrom
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Robert W. Day;Paul R. Milgrom
根据报告价值选择核心分配的拍卖会在均衡时产生有竞争力的销售收入水平，并限制投标人使用“托儿”的激励。在核心选择拍卖中，最小化卖方收入的拍卖也最大化真实报告的激励，当核心位于Vickrey拍卖中时产生Vickrey结果，与Vickrey拍卖相反，并且没有激励卖方排除合格的投标人。核心选择拍卖与稳定的匹配机制相关并共享属性。
Auctions that select core allocations with respect to reported values generate competitive levels of sales revenues at equilibrium and limit bidder incentives to use shills. Among core-selecting auctions, the ones that minimize seller revenues also maximize incentives for truthful reporting, produce the Vickrey outcome when that lies in the core and, in contrast to the Vickrey auction, and create no incentive for a seller to exclude qualified bidders. Core-selecting auctions are related to and share properties with stable matching mechanisms.