Enlargement processes and distributional conflicts: The politics of discriminatory membership in the European Union
Enlargement processes and distributional conflicts: The politics of discriminatory membership in the European Union
复制标题
扩大进程和分配冲突：欧盟成员身份歧视的政治
DOI：
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
C. Schneider
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Schneider
本文从博弈论的角度探讨了欧盟的歧视性成员资格。我认为，歧视性的成员资格使得国际组织的规模扩大，成员国的种类也多种多样。欧盟成员国对新成员国采取歧视性措施，将新成员国的扩张收益重新分配给受到特别负面影响的欧盟成员国，从而使扩张达到帕累托效率。对入盟谈判和所有五轮欧盟东扩结果进行概率分析的实证结果支持了这一理论主张。如果出现分配冲突，欧盟将授予加入国有限的成员资格。此外，候选人的讨价还价能力和替代补偿方案的可能性也会影响扩大结果。
This paper examines discriminatory membership in the European Union from a game-theoretical perspective. I argue that discriminatory membership enables the enlargement of international organizations with heterogenous member states. EU members impose discriminatory measures on new members to redistribute enlargement gains from new members to particularly negatively affected EU members as to render expansion pareto-efficient. The empirical findings of a probit analysis on the EU accession negotiations and outcomes of all five EU enlargement rounds support the theoretical claim. The EU grants acceding states restricted membership rights if distributional conflicts emerge. Moreover, the candidate’s bargaining power and the possibility of alternative compensation schemes influence the enlargement outcomes.