The wage penalty for motherhood
The wage penalty for motherhood
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DOI：
10.2307/2657415
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发表时间：
2001-04-01
影响因子：
9.1
通讯作者：
England, P
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Budig, MJ;England, P
母亲身份与较低的时薪相关，但其中原因尚未得到很好的理解。母亲可能比其他女性收入少，是因为生育孩子导致她们（1）失去工作经验，（2）工作效率降低，（3）为了适合母亲的工作而放弃高薪，或者（4）受到雇主歧视。或者这种关系可能是虚假的而非因果关系——收入潜力较低的女性可能生育孩子的比例相对较高。作者利用1982 - 1993年全国青年纵向调查的数据和固定效应模型来研究母亲身份导致的工资惩罚。结果显示，每生育一个孩子工资会降低7%。已婚女性受到的惩罚比未婚女性更大。生育（更多）孩子的女性工作经验年限更少，在控制工作经验后，每生育一个孩子仍有5%的工资惩罚。母亲所从事工作的“适合母亲”的特征，除了解释更多母亲比非母亲更倾向于兼职工作这一点外，对工资惩罚的解释力很小。母亲身份导致的工资惩罚中无法解释的部分，可能是由于母亲身份对工作效率的影响和/或雇主对母亲的歧视。虽然母亲养育孩子的益处广泛扩散——惠及雇主、邻居、朋友、配偶以及接受养育的成年人的孩子，但养育孩子的成本却不成比例地由母亲承担。
Motherhood is associated with lower hourly pay bur the causes of this are not well understood. Mothers may earn less than other women because having children causes them to (1) lose job experience, (2) be less productive at work, (3) trade off higher wages for mother-friendly jobs, or (4) be discriminated against by employers. Or the relationship may be spurious rather than causal-women with lower earning potential may have children at relatively higher rates. The authors use data from the 1982-1993 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth with fixed-effects models to examine the wage penalty for motherhood. Results show a wage penalty of 7 percent per child. Penalties are larger for married women than for unmarried women. Women with (more) children have fewer years of job experience. and after controlling for experience a penalty of 5 percent per child remains. "Mother-friendly" characteristics of the jobs held by mothers explain little of the penalty beyond the tendency of more mothers than non-mothers to work part-rime. The portion of the motherhood penalty unexplained probably results from the effect of motherhood on productivity and/or from discrimination by employers against mothers. While the benefits of mothering diffuse widely-to the employers, neighbors, friends, spouses, and children of the adults who received the mothering-the costs of child rearing are borne disproportionately by mothers.