A Model of Collateral, Investment, and Adverse Selection
A Model of Collateral, Investment, and Adverse Selection
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抵押品、投资和逆向选择模型
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1374286
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Alberto Martín
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Alberto Martín
本文刻画了逆向选择下企业家财富与总投资之间的关系。它的主要发现是，这种关系不一定是单调的。特别是，分析得出三个结果：(1)当企业财富相对较低时，更有可能出现投资与企业财富无关的集合均衡；(2)当企业财富相对较高时，最有可能出现分离均衡，在这种均衡中，企业财富投资增加；(3)对于给定的利率，企业财富的增加可能导致投资的不连续下降。
This paper characterizes the relationship between entrepreneurial wealth and aggregate investment under adverse selection. Its main finding is that such a relationship need not be monotonic. In particular, three results emerge from the analysis: (i) pooling equilibria, in which investment is independent of entrepreneurial wealth, are more likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively low; (ii) separating equilibria, in which investment is increasing in entrepreneurial wealth, are most likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively high and; (iii) for a given interest rate, an increase in entrepreneurial wealth may generate a discontinuous fall in investment.