PLC access control: a security analysis
PLC access control: a security analysis
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PLC访问控制：安全分析
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Ahmad Almulhem
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Haroon Wardak;Sami Zhioua;Ahmad Almulhem
可编程逻辑控制器(PLC)是一种非常常见的工业控制系统设备，用于根据从输入设备接收(和处理)的数据来控制输出设备。鉴于PLC在已部署的工业控制系统中发挥的核心作用，它一直是ICS攻击者的首选目标。在ICS-CERT存储库中快速搜索会发现，在总共589个咨询中，超过80个是目标PLC。Stuxnet攻击被认为是ICS上报道的最著名的事件，主要针对PLC。大多数PLC报告的事件都源于PLC被未经授权访问的事实。本文研究了PLC的访问控制问题。我们讨论了几种访问控制模型，但主要集中在常用的基于口令的访问控制。我们展示了这种基于口令的机制如何在现实场景中被攻破，并列出了由此可能衍生的攻击。本文详细介绍了一组针对最近版本的PLC(2016)的漏洞，这些漏洞在文献中没有报道。
A Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) is a very common industrial control system device used to control output devices based on data received (and processed) from input devices. Given the central role that PLCs play in deployed industrial control systems, it has been a preferred target of ICS attackers. A quick search in the ICS-CERT repository reveals that out of a total of 589 advisories, more than 80 target PLCs. Stuxnet attack, considered the most famous reported incident on ICS, targeted mainly PLCs. Most of the PLC reported incidents are rooted in the fact that the PLC being accessed in an unauthorized way. In this paper, we investigate the PLC access control problem. We discuss several access control models but we focus mainly on the commonly adopted password-based access control. We show how such passwordbased mechanism can be compromised in a realistic scenario as well as the list the attacks that can be derived as a consequence. This paper details a set of vulnerabilities targeting recent versions of PLCs (2016) which have not been reported in the literature.