Ownership and Control in a Competitive Industry
Ownership and Control in a Competitive Industry
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竞争行业中的所有权和控制权
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1767923
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
K. Stahl
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. Karle;T. Klein;K. Stahl
我们研究一个差异化的产品市场，在这个市场中，投资者最初拥有两家竞争公司之一的控股权，并可能直接使用自己的资产或间接通过受控公司收购竞争对手的非控股或控股权。虽然在对称的两种产品垄断中，行业利润最大化，但投资者只有在特殊情况下才能实现这一目标。相反，她有时会收购非控股股权。或者，如果她收购了一家控股公司，她会不对称地投资，而不是全面收购。一般来说，如果她只想影响产品市场的结果，她会间接投资，如果收购股份本身有利可图，她会直接投资。
We study a differentiated product market in which an investor initially owns a controlling stake in one of two competing firms and may acquire a non-controlling or a controlling stake in a competitor, either directly using her own assets, or indirectly via the controlled firm. While industry profits are maximized within a symmetric two product monopoly, the investor attains this only in exceptional cases. Instead, she sometimes acquires a noncontrolling stake. Or she invests asymmetrically rather than pursuing a full takeover if she acquires a controlling one. Generally, she invests indirectly if she only wants to affect the product market outcome, and directly if acquiring shares is profitable per se.