Freedom of choice and rational decisions
Freedom of choice and rational decisions
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选择自由和理性决定
DOI：
10.1007/bf00179829
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发表时间：
1995
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
C. Puppe
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. Puppe
本文正式提出了一个基于偏好的自由的概念，并探讨了在何种程度上这样一个概念是一致的，否则标准条件的理性决策。主要结果如下。假设一个基于偏好的机会集排序满足一个非常温和的条件“偏好自由选择”。然后，要么是退化的排序是不连续的，或基本方案之间的潜在的偏好关系是不完整的。因此，在任何情况下，基于偏好的自由度排名都会违反传统选择模型的一些基本假设。如果基于偏好的自由的条件稍微加强，这一结论就会得到加强。
The paper formalizes a notion of preference-based freedom and examines to which extent such a notion is consistent with otherwise standard conditions of rational decision making. The central result is as follows. Suppose that a preference-based ranking of opportunity sets satisfies a very mild condition of “preference for freedom of choice”. Then, either the ranking is degenerate in being discontinuous, or the underlying preference relation among the basic alternatives is incomplete. Hence, in any case preference-based rankings of freedom will violate at least some of the basic assumptions of traditional choice modelling. This conclusion is enhanced if the conditions on preference-based freedom are slightly strengthened.