Delegation in Veto Bargaining
Delegation in Veto Bargaining
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DOI：
10.1257/aer.20201817
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发表时间：
2020-06
影响因子：
10.7
通讯作者：
Navin Kartik;Andreas Kleiner;Richard Van Weelden
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Navin Kartik;Andreas Kleiner;Richard Van Weelden
提议者需要否决者的批准才能改变现状。提议者不确定Vetoer的偏好。我们展示了Vetoer通常被给予一个非单例菜单，或委托集，供其选择。最优集合平衡了妥协的程度和否决的风险。我们确定了某些授权集合出现的条件，包括“完全授权”：否决者可以在现状和提议者的理想行动之间选择任何行动。与基于专业知识的授权相比，当提议者的偏好更一致（可能）时，提议者给否决者的自由裁量权更少。（jel d72, d82）
A proposer requires a veto player’s approval to change a status quo. Proposer is uncertain about Vetoer’s preferences. We show that Vetoer is typically given a non-singleton menu, or delegation set, of options to pick from. The optimal set balances the extent of compromise with the risk of a veto. We identify conditions for certain delegation sets to emerge, including “full delegation”: Vetoer can choose any action between the status quo and Proposer’s ideal action. By contrast to expertise-based delegation, Proposer gives less discretion to Vetoer when their preferences are more (likely to be) aligned. (JEL D72, D82)