Reporting of Internal Control Deficiencies, Restatements, and Management Forecasts
Reporting of Internal Control Deficiencies, Restatements, and Management Forecasts
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发表时间：
2010-11
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通讯作者：
Katsuhiko Muramiya;T. Takada
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作者：
Katsuhiko Muramiya;T. Takada
本文以日本为例，分析了经营预测的准确性与内部控制的有效性之间的关系。Feng et al.（2009）研究发现，与美国其他公司相比，根据萨班斯-奥克斯利法案（SOX）报告内部控制缺陷的公司经理报告的盈利预测不太准确，管理层自愿披露预测。根据这一观点，我们的研究结果表明，在日本市场，披露内部控制缺陷和重述财务亮点的公司报告的管理预测不太准确，管理预测的披露是有效的。此外，我们发现，管理者的乐观偏见导致这种不准确的管理预测。我们的研究结果表明，内部控制的有效性有显着的影响，内部报告，这是用于形成预测，因此，内部控制的弱点诱导不准确的管理预测。
We examine the relationship between accuracy in management forecasts and the effectiveness of internal controls by using the unique setting in Japan, where disclosing management forecasts is effectively mandated. Feng et al. (2009) posit and find that managers of firms reporting internal control weaknesses under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) report less accurate earnings forecasts compared with other firms in the U.S., where management forecasts are disclosed voluntarily. In line with this notion, our results show that firms disclosing internal control deficiencies and those restating financial highlights report less accurate management forecasts in the Japanese market, where the disclosure of management forecasts are effectively mandated. Furthermore, we find that manager's optimistic biases cause such inaccurate management forecasts. Our results indicate that the effectiveness of internal controls has a significant impact on internal reports, which are used in forming forecasts; therefore, internal control weaknesses induce less accurate management forecasts.