Representation-, Leakage- and Cipher-Dependencies in Algebric Sidde-Channel Attacks
Representation-, Leakage- and Cipher-Dependencies in Algebric Sidde-Channel Attacks
复制标题
代数 Sidde 通道攻击中的表示、泄漏和密码依赖性
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
François
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Renauld;François
通过将侧信道信息泄漏的提取与经典的密码分析技术相结合，最近引入的代数侧信道攻击将标准DPA攻击中的一部分数据复杂度交易为更多的计算。但是，预测这种攻击的成功率变得更加困难，因为在求解大型代数方程组时，有许多参数起作用。在本文中，我们研究的影响，这些参数的经验，沿着的度量需要量化它们。首先，我们分析了不同的表示的边信道信息作为低次布尔方程的效率。其次，我们研究了不同类型的信息泄漏对攻击解决时间的影响。第三，我们讨论了这些结论如何依赖于目标密码。从模拟实验中进行了各种情况下，我们最后提供了一些更一般的直觉泄漏设备的安全性。
By combining the extraction of side-channel information leakages with classical cryptanalysis techniques, the recently introduced Algebraic Side- Channel Attacks trade a part of the data complexity in standard DPA attacks for more computations. But predicting the success rate of such attacks is made harder because of the numerous parameters that come into play when solving large algebraic systems of equations. In this paper, we study the impact of three of these parameters empirically, along with the metrics needed to quantify them. First, we analyze the efficiency of different representations of the side-channel information as low degree boolean equations. Second, we investigate the impact of different types of information leakages on the attack resolution times. Third, we discuss how these conclusions depend on the target ciphers. From simulated experiments performed in various contexts, we finally provide some more general intuitions for the security of leaking devices.